Shall he turn his face unto the isles - Antiochus had fitted out a great fleet of one hundred large ships and two hundred smaller, and with this fleet subdued most of the maritime places on the coast of the Mediterranean, and took many of the isles, Rhodes, Samos, Euboea, Colophon, and others.
But a prince for his own behalf - Or, a captain. The consul Acilius Glabrio caused the reproach to cease; beat and routed his army at the straits of Thermopylae, and expelled him from Greece. So he obliged him to pay the tribute which he hoped to impose on others; for he would grant him peace only on condition of paying the expense of the war, fifteen thousand talents; five hundred on the spot, - two thousand five hundred when the peace should be ratified by the senate, - and the remaining twelve thousand in twelve years, each year one thousand. See Polybius in his Legations, and Appian in the Wars of Syria. And thus: -
Without his own reproach - Without losing a battle, or taking a false step, Acilius caused the reproach which he was bringing upon the Romans to turn upon himself.
After this shall he turn his face unto the isles - The islands of the Mediterranean, particularly those in the neighborhood of and constituting a part of Greece. This he did in his wars with the Romans, for the Roman power then comprehended that part of the world, and it was the design of Antiochus, as already remarked, to extend the limits of his empire as far as it was at the time of Seleucus Nicator. This occurred after the defeat of Scopas, for, having given his daughter in marriage to Ptolemy, he supposed that he had guarded himself from any interference in his wars with the Romans from the Egyptians, and sent two of his sons with an army by land to Sardis, and he himself with a great fleet sailed at the same time into the AEgean Sea, and took many of the islands in that sea. The war which was waged between Antiochus and the Romans lasted for three years, and ended in the defeat of Antiochus, and in the subjugation of the Syrian kingdom to the Roman power, though, when it became a Roman province, it continued to be governed by its own kings. In this war, Hannibal, general of the Carthaginians, was desirous that Antiochus should unite with him in carrying his arms into Italy, with the hope that together they would be able to overcome the Romans; but Antiochus preferred to confine his operations to Asia Minor and the maritime parts of Greece; and the consequence of this, and of the luxury and indolence into which he sank, was his ultimate overthrow. Compare Jahn‘s “Heb. Commonwealth,” pp. 246-249.
And shall take many - Many of those islands; many portions of the maritime country of Asia Minor and Greece. As a matter of fact, during this war which he waged, he became possessed of Ephesus, AEtolia, the island of Euboea, where, in the year 191 b.c. he married Eubia, a young lady of great beauty, and gave himself up for a long time to festivity and amusements - and then entrenched himself strongly at the pass of Thermopyloe. Afterward, when driven from that stronghold, he sailed to the Thracian Chersonesus, and fortified Sestos, Abydos, and other places, and, in fact, during these military expeditions, obtained the mastery of no inconsiderable part of the maritime portions of Greece. The prophecy was strictly fulfilled, that he should “take many” of those places.
But a prince for his own behalf - A Roman prince, or a leader of the Roman armies. The reference is to Lucius Cornelius Scipio, called Scipio Asiaticus, in contradistinction from Publius Cornelius Scipio, called “Africanus, from his conquest over Hannibal and the Carthaginians. The Scipio here referred to received the name “Asiaticus,” on account of his victories in the East, and particularly in this war with Antiochus. He was a brother of Scipio Africanus, and had accompanied him in his expedition into Spain and Africa. After his return he was rewarded with the consulship for his services to the state, and was empowered to attack Antiochus, who had declared war against the Romans. In this war he was prosperous, and succeeded in retrieving the honor of the Roman name, and in wiping off the reproach which the Roman armies had suffered from the conquests of Antiochus. When it is said that he would do this “for his own, behalf,” the meaning is, doubtless, that he would engage in the enterprise for his own glory, or to secure fame for himself. It was not the love of justice, or the love of country, but it was to secure for himself a public triumph - perhaps hoping, by subduing Antiochus, to obtain one equal to what his brother had received after his wars with Hannibal. The motive here ascribed to this “prince” was so common in the leaders of the Roman armies, and has been so generally prevalent among mankind, that there can be no hesitation in supposing that it was accurately ascribed to this conqueror, Seipio, and that the enterprise in which he embarked in opposing Antiochus was primarily “on his own behalf.”
Shall cause the reproach offered by him to cease - The reproach offered by Antiochus to the Roman power. The margin is, “his reproach.” The reference is to the disagrace brought on the Roman armies by the conquests of Antiochus. Antiochus had seemed to mock that power; he had engaged in war with the conquerors of nations; he had gained victories, and thus appeared to insult the majesty of the Roman name. All this was turned back again, or caused to cease, by the victories of Scipio.
Without his own reproach - Without any reproach to himself - any discomfiture - any imputation of want of skill or valor. That is, he would so conduct the war as to secure an untarnished reputation. This was in all respects true of Scipio.
He shall cause it to turn upon him - The reproach or shame which he seemed to cast upon the Romans would return upon himself. This occurred in the successive defeats of Antiochus in several engagements by water and by land, and in his final and complete overthrow at the battle of Magnesia (190 b.c.) by Scipio. After being several times overcome by the Romans, and vainly sueing for peace, “Antiochus lost all presence of mind, and withdrew his garrisons from all the cities on the Hellespont, and, in his precipitate flight, left all his military stores behind him. He renewed his attempts to enter into negotiations for peace, but when he was required to relinquish all his possessions west of the Taurus, and defray the expenses of the war, he resolved to try his fortune once more in a battle by land. Antiochus brought into the field seventy thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, and a great number of camels, elephants, and chariots armed with scythes. To these the Romans could oppose but thirty thousand men, and yet they gained a decisive victory. The Romans lost only three hundred and twenty-five men; while, of the forces of Antiochus, fifty thousand infantry, four thousand cavalry, and fifteen elephants were left dead on the field, fifteen hundred men were made prisoners, and the king himself with great difficulty made his escape to Sardis. He now humbly sued for peace, and it was granted on the terms with which he had formerly refused compliance - that he should surrender all his possessions west of the Taurus, and that he should defray the expenses of the war. He further obligated himself to keep no elephants, and not more than twelve ships. To secure the performance of these conditions, the Romans required him to deliver up twelve hostages of their own selection, among whom was his son Antiochus, afterward surnamed Epiphanes.” - Jahn‘s “Hebrew Commonwealth,” pp. 248,249.
Verse 18
War with Pharnaces, king of the Cimmerian Bosporus, at length drew him away from Egypt. “On his arrival where the enemy was,” says Prideaux, “he, without giving any respite either to himself or them, immediately fell on, and gained an absolute victory over them; an account whereof he wrote to a friend of his in these three words: Veni, vidi, vici; I came, I saw, I conquered.” The latter part of this verse is involved in some obscurity, and there is difference of opinion in regard to its application. Some apply it further back in Caesar’s life, and think they find a fulfillment in his quarrel with Pompey. But preceding and subsequent events clearly defined in the prophecy, compel us to look for the fulfillment of this part of the prediction between the victory over Pharnaces, and Caesar’s death at Rome, as brought to view in the following verse. A more full history of this period might bring to light events which would render the application of this passage unembarrassed.DAR 238.4